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One of  the principal  arguments presented  against the  North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was that it would encourage domestic manufactur- 
ers to shut down their operations in the United States and move them to Mex- 
ico. The NAFTA debate was by no means the first time labor unions and other 
protectionist interests had appealed to such concerns in an attempt to restrict 
trade between the United States and low-wage countries. The offshore assem- 
bly provision  (OAP) of the U.S. tariff  code has been the focus of repeated 
debates, with labor consistently arguing for its repeal.' 
An OAP permits the duty-free return of domestically manufactured compo- 
nents that have been processed in another country The importing agent is re- 
quired to pay import duties only on the value added abroad. OAPs do reduce 
the cost of  moving  assembly operations  abroad-hence  the  source of  labor 
opposition-but  this is by  no means the sole effect of  offshore assembly  on 
the domestic economy. The existence of transport costs gives domestic compo- 
nents manufacturers  an incentive to locate near the foreign assembly plants 
they supply. If a US.  producer supplies assembly plants in a particular foreign 
region, the firm, all else equal, has an incentive to locate its production opera- 
tions in the U.S. port city or border area that offers the least-cost access to the 
foreign market. An OAP, then, potentially  affects not only the international 
location of assembly but also the internal location of complementary manufac- 
turing activities in the source country.2 
Gordon H. Hanson is assistant professor of economics at the University of Texas, Austin, and a 
faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of  Economic Research. 
The author thanks James Hanigan and conference participants for helpful comments. Raymond 
Robertson provided excellent research assistance. 
I. For a discussion of labor union opposition to the U.S. OAP, see Grunwald and Flamm (1985). 
Schoepfle and Perez-Lopez (1988), and Mendez (1993). 
2. This possibility may explain labor's coolness toward the argument that an OAP prevents the 
United States from losing entire industries-components  production and assembly-to  foreign 
countries. For a union, there is little difference between a components firm  moving to Asia and it 
moving to a right-to-work state such as Texas. 
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In this paper, I study the effect of offshore assembly on the location of man- 
ufacturing activity in the United States. The locational effects of  OAPs have 
yet to be addressed in the literature. Grossman (1982) develops a theoretical 
framework that identifies the conditions under which  an OAP offers greater 
protection  than  a conventional  pure-tariff  scheme. Finger  (1976),  Mendez, 
Murray, and Rousslang (1991), and Mendez (1993) examine the welfare effects 
of OAPs. All three studies find that, compared to a flat-rate tariff scheme, the 
US. OAP offers a slight to moderate improvement in welfare and redistributes 
income from domestic assemblers to components producers and consumers. 
One shortcoming of these analyses is that they aggregate over regions within a 
country. To the extent that an OAP causes components production in the source 
country to relocate internally, it may generate interregional distributional ef- 
fccts that are missed at the national level. 
An  additional motivation for studying the U.S. OAP is that it offers a pre- 
view of  the effects that NAFTA is likely to have on industry location in the 
United  state^.^ Mexico is one of  the largest suppliers of  OAP imports to the 
US.  economy. Given Mexico’s proximity to the United States and its relatively 
abundant  supply  of  low-wage labor,  the  country  is  a natural  site in  which 
to locate offshore assembly for the U.S. market. There is little reason to be- 
lieve that NAFTA will change the current binational pattern of  specialization 
in manufacturing. In the absence of trade barriers, it is likely that the United 
States will have a comparative advantage in components production and that 
Mexico will have a comparative advantage in assembly operations. To the ex- 
tent that transport costs matter for industry location, the U.S.-Mexico border 
region is likely to become an important production site for the integrated North 
American market. 
The approach I take is to study how  the growth of offshore  assembly  in 
Mexico has affected the U.S. border economy. I construct a data set of manu- 
facturing activities in US. and Mexican border cities using a combination of 
US.  and Mexican government sources. The cities on the US.-Mexico border 
form, in many respects, binational metropolitan areas. City pairs such as San 
Diego-Tijuana  and  El  Paso-Ciudad  Juarez  are  divided  by  an  international 
boundary, but they engage in extensive trade in goods and labor services. It is 
in the larger Mexican border cities that most offshore assembly for the U.S. 
market occurs. This makes U.S. border cities a natural site in which to locate 
complementary  manufacturing  activities.  The  particular  question  I  ask  is 
whether the growth of  export assembly plants in Mexican border cities has 
contributed  to the  expansion  of  specific manufacturing  activities  in  neigh- 
boring US.  border cities.4 
3.  There have been many studies on how NAFTA will affect resource allocation in the United 
StaLes. Canada, and Mexico (for a survey, see Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 119921). Only Hender- 
son ( 1993) addresses the intranational locational consequences of  economic integration. 
3.  Hanson (1996) examines the effect of US.-Mexico integration on the overall pattern of eco- 
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The body of  the paper has five sections.  Section 11.1 discusses  U.S. and 
Mexican  trade policies  regarding  offshore assembly.  Section 11.2 describes 
manufacturing activities in the US.-Mexico border region. Section  11.3 pres- 
ents empirical results. Section 11.4 concludes. 
11.1  Offshore Assembly and U.S.-Mexico Trade 
There are  two  categories  of  goods that  qualify  for the  US. OAP.  Item 
9802.00.60 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) of the United States (for- 
merly item 806.30 of the Tariff Schedule of the United States [TSUS]) permits 
the duty-free import of metal  products  that  are manufactured  in the United 
States and sent abroad  for further pro~essing.~  Item 9802.00.80 of  the HTS 
(formerly item 807.00 of the TSUS) permits the duty-free entry of inputs that 
are manufactured in the United States and assembled abroad.6 To  qualify for 
the 9802.00.80 exemption, the stated requirements are that domestic compo- 
nents may only be subject to assembly and assembly-related activities abroad. 
Goods imported under item 9802.00.80 account for over 98 percent of total 
OAP imports in any given year. 
Figure 11.1 shows total U.S. OAP imports in levels and as a share of  total 
U.S. imports for the period 1970-90.  Between 1980 and 1990, the share of 
OAP imports in total imports increased from 4.7 to 12.2  percent.' OAP imports 
are concentrated in three product  groups:  motor vehicles and motor vehicle 
parts, electronics, and apparel. Table 11.1 shows the share of selected products 
in total U.S. OAP imports, total dutiable U.S. OAP imports, and total duty- 
free U.S. OAP imports over the period 1980-90.  Duty-free OAP imports rep- 
resent the value of the final product that can be attributed to US.-manufactured 
parts and components; dutiable  OAP imports represent  value  added abroad. 
Machinery and equipment, in total, accounted for 88.6 to 92.3 percent of total 
5. TSUS item  806.30 incorporated into the tariff  code a provision of  the Tariff  Act of  1930. 
While the provision  was intended to facilitate the manufacturing practices of  US. steel firms that 
maintained operations in Canada. there was no apparent desire on the part of Congress to limit the 
provision to contiguous countries (U.S.  International Trade Commission 1988). 
6. Item 807.00 was created in  1963 by the U.S. Tariff Commission. It codified into law a 1954 
decision by  the U.S. Customs Court regarding customs practices established under the Tariff Act 
of  1930 (U.S. International Trade Commission 1988). 
7. OAF'  imports show a large increase between 1986 and 1987. This is partly the result of firm5 
reclassifying their imports under the OAF'  in order to avoid paying a custom user fee. whlch was 
introduced  In December  1986 (U.S. International Trade  Commission  1988). There are several 
tariff provisions that allow firms to import goods duty free. including the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP).  the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the Automotive Prod- 
ucts Trade Act (APTA). the Civil Aircraft Agreement. and the US.-Israel Free Trade Agreement. 
In addition. certain goods have a free duty rate under the most-favored-nation  (MFN)  clause. Firms 
entering imports under there provisions had until  1986 no incentive to also enter their goods under 
the OAP. With the imposition of a 0.22 percent ad valorem custom user fee in December  1986. 
many firms (except those  using the GSP or CBERA. which  are precluded from using the OAP) 
have begun entering their imports under the OAP to take advantage of the fact that both the duti- 
able and the duty-free portions of OAP imports are exempt from the user fee (U.S. International 
Trade Commission 1988). 300  Gordon H. Hanson 
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Fig. 11.1  U.S. OAP imports 
OAP imports over the period. Motor vehicles are the single largest category of 
OAP imports, accounting for 59.1 percent of total OAP imports in  1990. The 
next largest categories are electronic items, including semiconductors and of- 
fice machines, followed by apparel. 
There is considerable variation across products in the U.S. content of OAP 
imports. Table 1  1.2 shows duty-free OAP imports and dutiable OAP imports 
as shares of total OAP imports by  product over the period  1980-90.  In 1990, 
the duty-free share of OAP imports-the  share of the value of the final product 
attributable to U.S. parts and components-was  50 percent or higher in ap- 
parel, semiconductors, circuit breakers, and electrical conductors but was less 
than  25 percent  in motor vehicles, internal combustion  engines, and televi- 
sion receivers. 
Mexican trade policy allows domestic and foreign firms to take full advan- 
tage of the U.S. OAP. In 1965, Mexico began to permit the creation of export 
assembly plants under the Border Industrialization Program.*  The program ex- 
empted the plants, known as maquiladoras, from value-added taxes, duties on 
imported  inputs, and restrictions  on foreign ownership, as long as they ex- 
ported all their output (Hansen  1981). The tariff exemption was of particular 
importance prior to Mexico’s liberalization of trade in 1985. The combination 
of the U.S. OAP and Mexico’s maquiladora program implies that a firm that 
ships U.S.-manufactured  components to a plant in Mexico for assembly and 
8. One motivation for the Border Industrialization Program was the end of the Bracero Program 
(1948-64).  which had allowed Mexican nationals to work as agricultural laborers in the United 
States. The Mexican government was concerned about a sudden influx of returning workers and 
sought to create employment opportunities for them along the border (Hansen 1981). Table 11.1  US.  OAP Imports of Selected Products, 1980-90 
OAP Imports of Product as Share of 
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Table 11.1  (continued) 
OAP Imports of Product as Share of: 
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Source: US.  International Trade Commission, Imports underltems 806.30  arid 807.00 of  the Tariff 
Schedule uf  rhe  United States (various editions). 
Note: For the period  1980-90,  OAP imports are those entered under items 806.30 and 807.00 of 
TSUSA. The dutiable portion of  OAP imports is that equal to the value added by foreign sources; 
the duty-free portion is that equal to the value of US.-made parts and components. All products 
that follow machinery and equipment in the table belong to that product category. 
then reimports the finished good will, between the two countries, pay import 
duties in the United States only on the value of  Mexican labor and raw materi- 
als used in the assembly process. Initially, the maquiladora provisions were 
limited to a free-trade zone that occupied a twenty-kilometer strip on the Mexi- 
can side of the border with the United States. In 1972, the Mexican government 
began to allow the creation of maquiladoras in most parts of the country, and, 
in 1988, the government began to allow the plants to sell up to half their output 
on the domestic market (Schoepfle and Perez-Lopez  1990). 
Figure  11.2 shows U.S. OAP imports from Mexico as a share of total U.S. 
OAP imports for the period  1980-90.  For comparison, figure 11.2 also shows 
the share of total US. imports from Mexico. Mexico is the third largest sup- 
plier of OAP imports, accounting for 16.99 percent of total U.S. OAP imports 303  The Effects of Offshore Assembly on Industry Location 
Table 11.2  Dutiable and Duty-Free Content of OAP Imports, 1980-90 
Share of OAP Imports of  Product That Are: 
Product and Year  Dutiable  Duty Free 













































































.2  I8 
Note: See note to table  1 I. I 
in 1990.’ Table 11.3 shows Mexico’s share of U.S. OAP imports for selected 
products  over the period  1984-90.  Compared to the overall pattern of  U.S. 
OAP imports, OAP imports from Mexico are much less concentrated in motor 
vehicles: Mexico’s share of U.S. OAP imports of motor vehicles did not exceed 
6 percent over the period. Mexico is the major supplier of U.S. OAP imports 
9. The largest suppliers of  U.S. OAP imports are Canada and Japan, owing mainly to motor 
vehicle imports from the two countries. In 1987, Canada and Japan accounted for 31.4 and 21.7 
percent of total U.S. OAP imports, respectively. Motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts accounted 
for 77.  I  percent of  OAP imports from Canada and 94.  I  percent of OAP imports from Japan. 304  Gordon H. Hanson 
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Fig. 11.2  US.  imports from Mexico 
in  a number  of  electronic  and electrical  products.  In  1990, the country  ac- 
counted  for over 80 percent of  U.S. OAP imports of  electrical conductors, 
motors and generators,  and television  receivers and over 30 percent of US. 
OAP imports of  motor vehicle parts and circuit breakers.  During the  1980s, 
Mexico became a relatively less important source of  U.S. OAP apparel im- 
ports. 
Export  assembly  plants  in  Mexico  are overwhelmingly  concentrated  in 
states on the country’s northern border. Table 11.4 shows employment in ma- 
quiladoras for border and nonborder states in Mexico over the period 1974-89. 
There has been  a tremendous expansion in  offshore  assembly over the  last 
two decades. During the sample period, total export assembly employment (in 
border and nonborder plants combined) in Mexico grew at an average annual 
rate of  11.3 percent. Within border states, maquiladoras are concentrated in a 
few border cities. In  1989, maquiladora employment in the six largest border 
cities accounted for 66.7 percent of national maquiladora employment.’” One 
factor that may explain the geographic concentration of export assembly plants 
within the border region is the existence of industrial parks in certain border 
cities, which provide water and power services and often rent warehouse space 
and production facilities (Sklair 1989). Such services are scarce or nonexistent 
in other parts of the border region. 
In its original conceptualization,  U.S. and Mexican supporters of the maqui- 
ladora program envisioned a “twin-plant” production arrangement, in which a 
plant located in a U.S. border city would manufacturer components and a plant 
10. These cities are Tijuana, Mexicali, Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, and Matarnoros. Table 11.3  OAP Imports from Mexico as Share of Total U.S. OAP Imports, 
1984-90 
Share of  US.  OAP Imports from Mexico 
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Table 11.3  (continued) 
Share of US.  OAP Imports from Mexico 
Product and Year  All OAP  Dutiable  Duty Free 
Semiconductors: 
1984  ,047  .038  ,053 
1986  . I09  ,083  ,132 
1988  ,054  .04  1  ,065 
I990  ,060  ,052  ,066 
I984  .386  .4  I0  ,114 
1986  .I19  ,152  ,894 
I988  ,902  ,883  ,971 
1990  .924  .9  12  ,966 
Television receivers: 
Note: See note to table  I I.  I. 
located in the neighboring  Mexican border city would assemble the compo- 
nents into a finished good (Grunwald and Flamm 1985).  A common manage- 
ment  team  located in  the  United  States would  run both plants.  Under  this 
scheme, the expansion of assembly production in Mexico would lead directly 
to  the  expansion  of  complementary manufacturing  activities  in  the United 
States. In the now large literature on the maquiladora industry, there is near 
unanimity that the twin-plant system never materialized. It is well known that 
maquiladoras have expanded rapidly, but there is a general belief that, outside 
the growth of  transport and related services, counterpart development has not 
occurred on the U.S. side of the border.Il Curiously, there has been no system- 
atic study of manufacturing  activities in U.S. border cities. It is to this issue 
that I now turn. 
11.2  The U.S. Border Economy 
While the border region encompasses a vast area, most economic activity, 
and certainly most manufacturing activity, occurs in a few large cities. For the 
purposes of this study, I focus on the six largest U.S. border cities and their 
Mexican counterparts.  The US.-Mexico border city pairs are the following: 
San Diego-Tijuana,  Imperial  County-Mexicali,  El Paso-Ciudad  Juarez, La- 
redo-Nuevo  Laredo, McAllen-Reynosa, and Brownsville-Matamoros.12  The 
first two U.S. urban areas are in California; the second four are in Texas. Data 
1 I. On the perceived failure of  the twin-plant scheme, see Grunwald and Flamm (1985). Sklair 
(1989), and Wilson (1992). 
12. The two principal cities opposite Mexicali, Calexico and El  Centro, arc not large enough to 
be  classified as metropolitan statistical  areas (MSAs). Instead, 1 measure economic activity in 
these cities using data on Imperial County, California, in which both cities are located. 307  The Effects of Offshore Assembly on Industry Location 
Table 11.4  Maquiladora Employment in Mexico, 1974-89 
Mexico Border States  Mexico Nonborder States 





















































































Source: Mexico National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information (INEGI). 
Nore: Border slates refers to states in Mexico that border the United States. The employment share 
is the share of national maquiladora employment. The average annual growth rate is the average 
annual log change over the period. 
on one-digit employment and two-digit earnings for US.  metropolitan statisti- 
cal areas (MSAs)  are available for the  period  1970-90  from the  Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). Data on earnings, employment, value added, and 
imported inputs in maquiladoras are available for Mexican border cities over 
the period 1974-89 from the Mexican National Institute for Statistics, Geogra- 
phy, and Information (INEGI). 
U.S. border cities have experienced rapid employment growth over the last 
two decades. Table 11.5 shows employment in private nonfarm activities and 
in manufacturing for the U.S. border region over the period  1970-90. During 
the 1970s and, to a lesser extent, the 1980s, California and Texas experienced 
rapid growth in total employment and in manufacturing employment relative 
to the nation as a whole. With a few exceptions, employment growth has been 
even more rapid in the border cities. In the  1980s, while California, Texas, 
and the rest of the nation had near zero employment growth in manufacturing, 
manufacturing  employment grew at an annual average rate of  3.9 percent in 
McAllen, 2.4 percent in San Diego, and 1.5 percent in El Paso. 
The expansion of  manufacturing  activities in the border has been concen- 
trated in certain industries. Table 11.6 shows an average annual growth in total Table 11.5  Employment in U.S. Border Cities and Border States, 1970-90 
Private, Nonfarm Employment  Manufacturing Employment 
('000s of workers)  ('000s of workers) 
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Source: BEA, Regional Economic Information System 
Nore: The cities listed are metropolitan statistical areas, as defined by the BEA (except for Impe- 
rial. which is Imperial County, California). MSAs typically encompass groups of cities that form 
a contiguous urban area. Annual growth refers to the annual average log change in employment 
over the previous decade. Table 11.6  Average Annual Growth in Total Earnings by Manufacturing 
Industry, 1975-90 
Average Annual Growth in Total Earnings (log change in 
total eamings/U.S. PPI) 
Border City Industry  City  State  Nation 
Manufacturing: 
Brownsville  ,020 
El Paso  ,034 
Laredo  ,027 
McAllen  ,069 
Imperial  -.014 
San Diego  ,060 
Brownsvillle  ,017 
El Paso  ,023 
Laredo  ,024 
McAllen  ,066 
Imperial  -  ,029 
San Diego  ,066 
Brownsville  ,052 
El Paso  .002 
Laredo  .lo9 
McAllen  .08  1 
Imperial  -  ,044 
Nondurable goods: 
Apparel: 
San Diego  ,012 
Durable goods: 
Brownsville  ,024 
El Pa50  ,058 
Laredo  .03  1 
McAllen  ,079 
San Diego  ,059 
Brownsville  ,068 
El Paso  ,198 
Laredo  ,094 
McAllen  ,162 
San Diego  ,075 
Brownsville  ,182 
El Paso  .060 
San Diego  .068 
Imperial  .0 I 3 
Elec. & electronic equip.: 
Imperial  ,158 
Motor vehicles: 
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earnings, deflated  by  the U.S.  PPI, for selected manufacturing  industries in 
U.S. border cities over the period 1975-90.  Relative to the United States as a 
whole, average annual earnings growth in durable goods was more rapid in five 
of the border cities, and average annual earnings growth in nondurable goods 
was more rapid in four of the border cities. The most dramatic differences in 
earnings growth are for the specific industries that account for most offshore 
assembly: apparel, electric and electronic equipment, and motor vehicles and 
motor vehicle parts. While average annual real earnings growth in apparel was 
nearly flat (0.3 percent) for the nation as a whole, it was 5.2 percent in Brown- 
sville, 10.9 percent in Laredo, and 8.1 percent in McAllen. And, while average 
annual real earnings growth in electric and electronic equipment was 1.8 per- 
cent for the United States as a whole, it was over 6 percent in each of the border 
cities and over 15 percent in El Paso, McAllen, and Imperial County. Owing 
to disclosure restrictions, earnings data in motor vehicles are available only for 
Brownsville, El Paso, and San Diego. In each of  these cities, average annual 
real earnings growth was more than 4 percent higher than for the nation  as 
a whole. 
The industries in which offshore assembly is concentrated now account for 
the majority of border manufacturing activity.I3  Table 11.7 shows the share of 
two-digit earnings in total manufacturing earnings for border cities and states 
in 1975 and 1990. In 1990, while apparel accounted for 2.8 percent of national 
manufacturing  earnings,  it accounted  for over 25 percent  of manufacturing 
earnings in Brownsville, El Paso, and McAllen. Similarly, while electrical and 
electronic  equipment accounted  for 9.0  percent  of  national  manufacturing 
earnings, the industry accounted for over  14 percent of earnings in El Paso, 
Laredo, and San Diego. 
Some questions remain regarding the nature of the manufacturing activities 
located in U.S. border cities. While I argue that these activities represent com- 
ponents production and other activities that are complementary to offshore as- 
sembly, it is entirely possible that part or all of border manufacturing is unre- 
lated to export manufacturing in Mexico. Unfortunately, the BEA data do not 
identify whether manufacturing activities take the form of components produc- 
tion, final goods production, or assembly. Anecdotal evidence, however, sug- 
gests that much U.S. border manufacturing represents components production 
for Mexican maquiladoras. Reports in the Twin Plant News,  a US.  trade maga- 
zine for firms that engage in offshore assembly in Mexico, identify two types 
of manufacturing activities that predominate in US.  border cities: plastic injec- 
tion molding and metal stamping. Both activities are general techniques used 
to create parts and components for domestic electronic devices and motor ve- 
13. Food products has historically been the major manufacturing industry in the U.S. border 
region. In  1975, it accounted for over 20 percent of  manufacturing earnings in Brownsville, La- 
redo, McAllen, and Imperial County. While the industry is still relatively large in McAllen and 
Imperial County, over the period 1975-90 the industry's share of manufacturing earnings fell from 
23.8 to 14.4 percent in Brownsville and from 29.3 to 13.4 percent in Laredo. Table 11.7  Regional Industry Shares of Regional Manufacturing Earnings, 1975 
and 1990 
Industry and Region 
~~ 
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Note. See note to table  1 I .5 312  Gordon H. Hanson 
hic1es.l‘ Injection-molding and metal-stamping firms appear to be mostly inde- 
pendent suppliers of major automobile companies or name-brand  electronics 
producers.  Some of these firms have relocated to the border at the behest of 
their major buyers. 
The data presented in this section are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
expansion of  export assembly activities in Mexican border cities has contrib- 
uted to an increase in manufacturing activities in U.S. border cities. The expan- 
sion of  border  manufacturing  could, however, be due to  local labor market 
conditions, such as low wages arising from an abundant local immigrant labor 
supply. In the next section, I use more formal techniques to identify the effects 
of  offshore  assembly  in  Mexico on  border manufacturing  activities  in  the 
United States. 
11.3  Empirical Results 
11.3.1  Model Specification 
To study the effects of offshore assembly in Mexico on manufacturing activ- 
ities in U.S. border cities, I develop a simple model of employment at the city 
and industry  level. As the demand for a city-industry’s output expands, the 
city-industry  will increase the amount of  labor it employs. Following Hanson 
(1996), labor demand at the city-industry  level can be modeled as a function 
of sources of demand for city-industry output. 
Consider a competitive  labor market in which  labor demand in city  i by 
industry j at time t is given by the expression 
where Xt,, is a vector of factors that shift labor demand, W?,,  is the wage in city- 
industry ij, and &,,,  is an unobserved shock to city-industry labor demand that 
has mean zero and constant variance uE.  Let labor supply in the city-industry 
be given by 
(2)  Lt, = g(AWG,,,, W,,, eFiJr, 
where AWG,,, is the alternative wage for workers in the city-industry, and IJ.,,, 
represents  an unobserved  shock to city-industry  labor supply that has mean 
zero and constant variance u~. 
From equations (1) and (2). I derive a reduced-form regression equation for 
equilibrium city-industry employment. I assume that  this expression  can be 
written as 
14, Rsports in the  7it  irr Plorit Neii..~  state that employment in the El Paso plastic injection mold- 
ing  industry  greu  by  700 percent  between  1981 and  1988 (Roard 1990) and that in  1993 the 
industry  supplied 5200 million worth of plastic components to Mexico’s offshore assembly indus- 
try (Goldsberry  1993). El  Paso Community College and the University of Texas at El Paso now 
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(3)  In L,,t = (Y  + y In AGWN,  + In X,,,P  + u,,~, 
where (Y and y are scalars, P is a vector of parameters, and the error term vlJ, is 
the weighted sum of the labor demand and labor supply shocks. There is also, 
of  course,  an  analogous reduced-form expression  for the  equilibrium city- 
industry wage. Given that there are no data on wages at the two-digit industry 
level, I restrict my attention to employment. 
I identify three variables that shift city-industry labor demand: total personal 
income in the state in which the MSA is located (SINC,,), total employment 
in the national  industry  (USL,),  and employment in maquiladoras that are 
located in the Mexican border city that neighbors the U.S. MSA (MAQJ.  The 
first two variables capture domestic demand for output by  the city-industry. 
The third  variable,  maquiladora  employment, captures foreign  demand for 
city-industry output. To avoid introducing simultaneity bias into the regression, 
I measure state personal income excluding the MSA on which the observation 
is  taken  and measure national  industry  employment  excluding  the state in 
which the MSA is located. 
Incorporating the output-demand variables into equation (3), the estimating 
equation is 
(4)  In L,,, = a + y  In AWG,,, + 0,  In SINCr,, 
+ Pz  In USL8,,  + P,  In MAQ,, + u,,,. 
Two measures of  the alternative wage are available: the average state manufac- 
turing wage, which I calculate excluding the MSA on which the observation is 
taken, and the average wage in private nonfarm, nonmanufacturing  activities 
in the MSA. 
Unobserved factors may cause employment to vary systematically between 
border cities or over time. A downturn in the Mexican economy may lead to a 
sudden influx of Mexican immigrants at all border sites, or the existence of port 
facilities in one border city may cause it to have higher employment relative to 
other border cities.  To  control  for idiosyncratic  factors that  influence  city- 
industry employment, I include dummy variables for the year and city-industry 
in the regression. Table 11.8 defines the variables and provides summary sta- 
tistics. 
The variable  of  interest  in equation (4) is In  MAQ,,. If the expansion  of 
offshore assembly in a Mexican border city increases the demand for manufac- 
turing goods produced in the neighboring U.S. border city, the estimated coef- 
ficient on In MAQ,, will be positive. This would indicate that the increase in 
offshore assembly increases the demand for local cross-border manufacturing 
goods, which in turn increases the demand for local cross-border manufactur- 
ing labor. Given the concentration  of offshore assembly in certain industries, 
the effect of maquiladora activities may vary across industries. I allow for this 
possibility in the estimation. 314  Gordon H. Hanson 
Table 11.8 
Variable  Definition  Mean  SD  No.ofObs. 
Summary Statstics for Regression Variables 
In L  Log MSA industry earningdaverage  8.467  1.490  180 
MSA manufacturing wage 
(dependent variable) 
outside MSA (deflated by U.S. CPI) 
nonfarm, nonmanufacturing 
activities (delated by US. CPI) 
MSA (deflated by U.S. PPI) 
industry manufacturing wage, 
outside state in which MSA is 
located 
(converted into dollars and deflated 
by the U.S. PPI) in the Mexican 
border city that neighbors the U.S. 
MSA 
In AWG 1  Log average state manufacturing wage  -  1.345  .036  180 
In AWG2  Log average MSA wage in private  -1.970  ,111  180 
In SINC  Log state personal income outside  14.732  ,358  180 
In USL  Log national industry eamingshational  16.007  ,275  180 
In MAQ  Log maquiladora value added  -.755  ,115  90 
Nore: Observations for all variables are for the period  1975-89 
1 I .3.2  Data and Estimation Issues 
One problem for the estimation is that, at the two-digit industry level, data 
are available for total earnings but not for total  employment. This does not 
present an issue for estimating reduced-form coefficients on variables that shift 
labor demand, given that, as long as labor supply is not backward bending, 
outward labor-demand shifts increase both earnings and employment. It does, 
however, present a problem for estimating reduced-form coefficients on vari- 
ables that  shift labor supply. Depending  on labor demand elasticities,  shifts 
in the labor supply curve may generate earnings and employment changes of 
opposite sign. To deal with this issue, I adjust earnings by dividing the variable 
by  the average one-digit manufacturing wage in the MSA.I5 
A second problem is that BEA disclosure restrictions prevent the release of 
data on industries that contain a single establishment.  In the  smaller urban 
areas, such as Laredo and Imperial County, disclosure restrictions apply to over 
half the twenty two-digit manufacturing industries. A complete set of observa- 
tions at the two-digit level is available only for San Diego. My approach is to 
use data aggregated over durable and nondurable manufacturing industries at 
15. Estimation results using total earnings deflated by  the US.  PPI as the dependent variable 
are  similar  to  results  using  earnings  divided by  the average one-digit  wage as the dependent 
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the MSA level. The BEA publishes complete earnings data on durable-goods 
and nondurable-goods industries for all the MSAs in my sample. The durable- 
nondurable distinction remains useful for my purposes, given that, from table 
1 1.6 above, the industries that account for most offshore assembly-electrical 
and electronic equipment and motor vehicles  and motor vehicle parts-also 
account for most durable-goods manufacturing activity in U.S. border cities. 
Hence, I expect that the effects of offshore assembly on employment in U.S. 
border cities will be stronger for durable-goods industries than for nondurable- 
goods industries. 
A final issue for estimation is that the variable In  MAQ,, may be correlated 
with the error term, u,]~.  One source of correlation is measurement error. It may 
be the case that In MAQlt  does not capture all activity in the Mexican border 
area that creates demand for manufacturing goods produced in the neighboring 
U.S. border city. Measurement error will tend to bias the coefficient estimate 
on In  MAQ,, toward zero (Griliches 1986).  A second source of correlation be- 
tween In MAQ,, and u,],  is that the allocation of maquiladora activities across 
Mexican border cities may itself be a function of  the characteristics of U.S. 
border cities. It may be desirable to locate assembly  plants opposite a U.S. 
border city that has a large local consumer market or good highways and ware- 
house facilities. In  such a case, the unobserved shocks to U.S. city-industry 
employment will also affect the level of production in maquiladoras located in 
the neighboring Mexican city. If the level of maquiladora activity in a Mexican 
border city is correlated with employment shocks in the U.S. border city, the 
OLS coefficient estimate on maquiladora activities will be biased. 
To correct for measurement error and possible endogeneity bias, I use instru- 
mental variables (IV) estimators. An ideal instrument is one that is correlated 
with In  MAQ,, and uncorrelated with v,],.  If there is no serial correlation in the 
error term, lagged values of the suspect endogenous variable are valid instru- 
ments. The instruments I use are current values of the other explanatory vari- 
ables and lagged values of In MAQ,,. 
1 1.3.3  Empirical Results 
I report  OLS and IV estimation results for equation (4). Observations are 
pooled across MSAs on durable and nondurable manufacturing industries for 
the period 1974-89.  I use two measures of the alternative wage, the state manu- 
facturing wage (outside the MSA) and the MSA average wage in nonmanufac- 
turing activities. 
In table  11.9, I report  OLS and IV regression  results for equation  (4), in 
which I constrain the coefficient on maquiladora employment to be equal for 
durable- and nondurable-goods manufacturing industries. The results are con- 
sistent with the hypothesis that growth in offshore assembly in Mexico contri- 
butes to the expansion of manufacturing in U.S. border cities. Coefficient esti- 
mates on In MAQ are positive and statistically significant in the 1 percent level 316  Gordon H. Hanson 
Table 11.9  US.  Border-City Manufacturing Employment Estimation Results 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Estimation Method 
OLS  IV 
In  AWGl 
In AWG2 
-  1.9878 
(1.9955) 
In  SlNC  .9544 
(3121) 
In  USL  -1.1096 
(.9034) 
























(.93  12) 
(.0809) 
-1.0971 
,495  2* * 
-3.546** 
test statistic 
Adjusted R'  .984  ,984  ,983  .985 
No. of observations  168  168  168  168 
Note: Observations are pooled across durable-goods and nondurable-goods manufacturing indus- 
tries in six U.S. border urban areas (San Diego, Imperial County, El Paso, Laredo, McAllen, and 
Brownsville) over the period  1974-89.  All regressions  include dummy  variables for the city- 
industry and the year, which are not shown. Instruments include the (presumed) exogenous inde- 
pendent variables and the first lag of In MAQ. 
**Indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
in all regressions. The results do not depend on which measure of the alterna- 
tive wage I use.'6 
The coefficient estimates on In  MAQ in  the  IV regressions  are  approxi- 
mately one-third larger than those in the OLS regressions, which is consistent 
with the presence of  measurement error. To  determine whether there is mea- 
surement errodendogeneity bias in the regression, I perform a Hausman speci- 
fication test. I reject the null hypothesis that In MAQ is uncorrelated with the 
error term at a  1 percent level of  significance. The coefficient estimates from 
the IV regressions should, then, be viewed as the more reliable. 
The data presented in section  11.2 suggest that the growth of offshore as- 
sembly in Mexico has contributed  to the expansion of  specific manufactur- 
ing  industries  in  U.S.  border  cities. These industries-electrical  and  elec- 
tronic  equipment  and  motor  vehicles  and  motor  vehicle  parts-produce 
durable goods. To determine whether the expansion of offshore assembly in 
Mexican border cities has had larger effects for durable-goods manufacturing, 
16. The very high R2 statistics in tables  I I .9 and in table 11.10 below are due primarily to the 
city-industry dummy variables. When the city-industry dummies are excluded from the regression, 
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Table 11.10  Estimation Results with Industry-Varying Coefficients (standard 
errors in parentheses) 
Estimation Method 




In MAQ . DNON 
In MAQ  DDUR 
F-statistic on equality 
of coefficients for 
In MAQ 
Adjusted R' 
No. of observations 




















































Note: All  regressions  include dummy  variables for the city-industry and the year.  DNON  is a 
dummy variable indicating  nondurable-goods  industry; DDUR is a dummy variable indicating 
durable-goods industry. Instruments include the (presumed) exogenous independent variables and 
the first lag of In MAQ. 
+*Indicates  statistical signifance at the I percent level. 
I allow  the coefficient on In  MAQ to vary across durable- and nondurable- 
goods industries. Table 11.10 reports OLS and IV regression results. I again 
find that the coefficient estimates on In  MAQ are positive and statistically sig- 
nificant at the 1 percent level in all regressions. There is a striking difference 
between the results in tables  11.9 and  11.10. The coefficient estimates on In 
MAQ for durable-goods  industries  are  nearly  twice as  large  as  those  for 
nondurable-goods industries. In the first IV regression (col. 2a), the coefficient 
estimate on maquiladora value added is 0.578 for the durable-goods industry, 
compared to 0.359 for the nondurable-goods industry. I reject the null hypothe- 
sis that the coefficient on In MAQ is equal for durable- and nondurable-goods 
industries at a 1 percent level of  significance in all regressions. 
The estimation results are consistent with the hypothesis that the growth of 
offshore assembly in Mexico has contributed to the growth of complementary 
manufacturing activities in US.  border cities. The quantitative effect of maqui- 
ladora growth on US.  border employment implied by the coefficient estimates 
is substantial. IV estimation results (table 11.10, col. 2a) imply that a 10 per- 
cent increase  in  offshore  assembly  activities in  Mexico leads to a 5.8 per- 318  Gordon H. Hanson 
cent increase in durable-goods  manufacturing  and a 3.6 percent increase in 
nondurable-goods manufacturing in U.S. border cities. These effects are large, 
considering that offshore assembly along the Mexican border has been grow- 
ing at a rate of more than 10 percent per year for the last two decades. 
11.4  Concluding Remarks 
The results of this paper have implications for how the U.S. economy will 
adjust to NAFTA, conditional on the outcome that NAFTA causes export as- 
sembly in Mexico to expand. U.S. border cities are an obvious site in which to 
locate production of parts and components  consumed  by  Mexican maquilu- 
dorus. While manufacturing growth in the U.S. border region has been largely 
overlooked in the discussion surrounding North American economic integra- 
tion, the data tell a very clear story. As maquiladoras in Mexico have expanded 
over the last two decades, so, too, have complementary manufacturing activi- 
ties in U.S. border cities. The estimation results provide strong support for the 
hypothesis that the growth of maquiladoras in Mexico increases the demand 
for manufacturing goods produced in U.S. border cities. 
A key question is whether the export assembly industry in Mexico will con- 
tinue  to expand  with  the  implementation  of  NAFTA. In  a purely  legalistic 
sense, NAFTA means the end of the maquiladora regime: it eliminates the “in- 
bond”  arrangement,  under which Mexican  export assembly plants posted  a 
bond for the value of the duties on the inputs they imported from abroad that 
was later returned to them once the products containing the imported inputs 
were exported. This does not mean, however, that NAFTA will alter the current 
pattern of  specialization in which Mexican plants assemble goods from U.S .- 
made components and export the goods to the U.S. market. Curiously, none of 
the computable  general equilibrium  models developed to study NAFTA ad- 
dress the effects of trade reform on Mexico’s export assembly industry. In an 
appendix,  I  use the  partial  equilibrium  framework developed by  Grossman 
(1982) to determine what effect NAFTA will have on the offshore-assembly 
arrangement-the  arrangement in which goods made from US. components 
are assembled in Mexico. While such an approach has obvious limitations, the 
general thrust of the analysis is sensible. 
Given Mexico’s low relative wages, it is likely that the country will continue 
to specialize in the assembly of manufactured goods for the North American 
market. The more difficult question is which country will produce the compo- 
nents that maquiladoras assemble. The pre-NAFTA pattern of trade between 
the United States and Mexico tells us something about each country’s compara- 
tive advantage. Prior to NAFTA, many goods, including television  receivers, 
motor vehicle parts, and apparel, that were produced from U.S. components 
and assembled in Mexico were consumed in both the United States and Mex- 
ico. Even  with  the  pre-NAFTA  tariff  disadvantage  in the  Mexican  market, 
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abolition of trade barriers should strengthen the comparative advantage of the 
United States in components production. Of course, such an argument ignores 
the possibility that NAFTA will change relative prices enough that the United 
States no longer has a comparative advantage in components production. This 
is unlikely, however, given that pre-NAFTA tariffs were low for most products. 
The most likely scenario is that NAFTA will cause Mexican assembly plants 
and U.S. components producers to expand, in which case one can expect man- 
ufacturing  activities in the United  States to continue to relocate to the U.S. 
border region. 
Appendix 
I use the framework in  Grossman (1982) to assess the effects of NAFTA on 
industries that engage in offshore assembly. The analysis considers the pattern 
of production  that would emerge if  tariffs  were eliminated  and pre-NAFTA 
prices remained  constant.  Such an exercise ignores the general equilibrium 
effects of trade reform, but it remains useful as a way to identify who benefits 
from the lowering of trade barriers, holding constant changes in other indus- 
tries. 
Consider a final good j that is produced in two stages. In stage 1, an interme- 
diate good n is produced, and, in stage 2, the intermediate good is assembled 
into a final product. One unit of n is required to produce one unit of j.  Let P; A 
be the price of the final good j,  where i is the source country for the intermedi- 
ate good, and k is the country in which assembly occurs. Let e,  be the price of 
good n produced in country i. There are two countries: the United States, in- 
dexed by U,  and Mexico, indexed by M.  Both have tariffs on intermediate and 
final goods, where t:, is the tariff on good h in country  i.  There are also costs 
in shipping goods between countries, where s,,  is the unit cost of shipping good 
h from the United States to Mexico, or vice versa. 
I assume that all agents are price takers and that identical goods are con- 
sumed in the two countries. In practice, there are three possible structures of 
production: (1) pure U.S. production, (2) intermediate-good production in the 
United States and assembly in Mexico, and (3) pure Mexican production. The 
type 2 structure is the offshore assembly arrangement. Arbitrage implies that, 
in any given market, all types of good j  must sell for the same price. 
Consider the US.  market for good j.  The U.S. price for a type 2 good is 
(All 
The price P,""  is the unit cost of producing the good (which includes the cost 
.T,,  of  transporting the intermediate good from the United States to Mexico for 
assembly). The final good  must be  transported  from Mexico  to the United 
Py"  + t,"  (PY"  -  PY -  s,,)  + s,. 320  Gordon H. Hanson 
States, where a tariff is levied on the value added abroad. In the United States, 
type 2 goods compete with type  1 goods (e.g., television sets, apparel, motor 
vehicles). While assembly costs are higher for goods wholly produced in the 
United States, producers of  these goods avoid the transport costs and import 
duties incurred in offshore assembly. Arbitrage requires that the U.S. price for 
all types of good  j  be equal: 
plu.u = pu.M  + fu  (pu.M -  pu -  + s1,  (A21  1  I1 
In  few, if  any,  of these markets are goods wholly produced  in Mexico con- 
sumed in the United States. It must then be true that 
(A3)  PyM(l  + 5") + s,  2  PyM  + r,!-'(PYM  + Pu  ,I  -  s,,)  -  3,. 
The price of goods wholly produced in Mexico, inclusive of tariffs and trans- 
port costs, exceeds the price of offshore assembly goods and goods wholly 
produced in the United States. 
Given (A2) and (A3), the effects of eliminating tariffs are ambiguous. De- 
pending  on the sign of  Py" -  PYM,  NAFTA may  or may  not cause goods 
wholly produced in Mexico to be sold in the U.S. market. Pre-NAFTA compe- 
tition in the Mexican market implies price relations that help resolve this ambi- 
guity. Suppose that Mexico consumes quantities of good j that are wholly do- 
mestically  produced  (e.g.,  apparel,  some  motor  vehicles).  If  Mexico also 
consumes goods wholly produced in the United States, it must be true that 
('44)  P,""  = PYU  (1 + ry) + s,. 
If, instead or in addition, Mexico consumes offshore assembly goods, it must 
be true that 
pM.M = pU.M + tM PU.  (A51  n  ,,  I  I 
Equation (A5) shows that offshore assembly goods sold in Mexico are required 
to pay duties on the imported inputs used in production. Equations (A4) and 
(A5) may hold simultaneously. 
Consider the effects of  eliminating tariffs  in both countries. Take first the 
case in which, prior to NAFTA, Mexico consumes quantities of good j  pro- 
duced  under  offshore  assembly. At pre-NAFTA  prices,  equations  (A2) and 
(A5) imply that 
(A2')  Py" > P?"  + s,, 
P,""  > PY". 
Offshore  assembly  becomes  the  least-cost  strategy  of  producing  good j  for 
both markets. This would cause U.S. components producers and Mexican as- 
sembly plants to expand and Mexican components producers and US.  assem- 
bly plants to contract. Now consider the case where, prior to NAFTA, goods 
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prices, it is again true that equation (A2') holds, and, from equation (A4), it is 
now true that 
(A4')  Py  > Py."  + s,. 
Combining equations (A2') and (A4'), it is clear that, in this case also, offshore 
assembly is the least-cost production strategy for both markets. Holding con- 
stant changes in other industries, NAFTA causes offshore assembly to expand. 
In addition to ignoring general equilibrium effects, the analysis ignores the 
existence of countries outside NAFTA and the effects of scale economies. The 
second omission is likely to be the more serious. If production in manufactur- 
ing is subject to increasing returns to scale, NAFTA may lead to greater spe- 
cialization  in components production in all  three  countries.  In this  event, 
NAFTA  would cause components production to expand in both the United 
States and Mexico. Even in this case, however, there is still no reason to believe 
that product assembly in Mexico would contract. As long as Mexico special- 
izes in assembly, US.  components producers would have an incentive to locate 
a portion of their activities in the U.S. border region. 
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